Protect G20 Bigwigs Or Innocents In A Warzone? We Can Do Both
How many soldiers does it take to secure a vast country filled with guns, war criminals, and xenophobes hiding in caves and in plain sight; where the economy is a shambles; and where the leadership increasingly appears to have nothing but contempt for democratic principles or the civil rights enshrined in its own constitution?
Well, how many cops does it take to secure a few city blocks in a place with close to zero guns, with a rebounding economy, where democracy and the rule of law are pretty much taken for granted?
Some will say this is a ridiculous comparison – Afghanistan and Toronto -- but why not? Let’s get into it.
For the G20 conference in Toronto, we had 19,000 security personnel. Crusades have been launched with fewer boots on the ground. The centre of Canada’s most famous metropolis was turned into a passable imitation of the Green Zone of Iraq. The security price tag was around $1 billion for just a few days – and again, to secure only a tiny stretch of downtown.
And what did this draconian exercise achieve? For all that was spent, did this overwhelming force actually manage to prevent every conceivable threat?
Well, yes and no.
First, the no. Everyone’s seen the photographs of blazing police cruisers – oddly, with police standing in rough formation not far away, and seemingly in no rush to stop the spectacle. And a bunch of businesses got their windows smashed in.
Now, the yes. Did the cops achieve their main objective? Sure. No troublemaker got within 300 yards of any G20 leader, diplomat, or economist.
And I suppose that’s the point. The clear aim of the security apparatus was to protect conference attendees. They certainly did that. So what if some cop cars got burnt? That’s what security is for – they take the hit so ordinary folks don’t have to worry about it.
Was it all necessary? By any reasonable accounting, no. But then, how much of a price do we put on preventing the distinguished viceroy of Italy from embarrassment? A broken arm? I suppose it’s somewhere on the lower end between $1 and $1 billion, but I couldn’t tell you precisely what it is.
Now we turn to Afghanistan. Americans are boosting their troop presence in Afghanistan to 100,000 by September. Other countries are upping their commitment in dribs and drabs; the French are shipping in another 250 soldiers. Meanwhile, in the absence of any coherent policy, governments like Canada’s are looking for the exits. How many troops and guns are really needed?
Again, it’s hard to put a number on it. Clearly, better security is needed. This, despite the number of troops currently on the ground and the military training dollars – $27 billion from the U.S. alone – that have to date produced an Afghan Security Force wholly unfit to defend even small pockets of their own sovereign territory.
But again, what is the objective?
We want to prevent assassinations and bombings of key leaders in Afghanistan from the township on up to the President’s office. We want to stop the enemy from going into villages and raping, pillaging, and executing anyone who doesn’t offer up their son for service with the jihad.
We want girls to be able to go to school without worrying about getting burnt alive or having their faces sprayed with acid. And it would be awfully nice if we could ensure humanitarian aid workers and other nice foreign personnel don’t get summarily machine-gunned as “spies” by the Taliban.
And we ultimately want to prevent the country from sliding into a regional civil war that could end the lives of hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of people.
These are certainly worthy objectives. How much is this worth? Again, I don’t know. Somewhere between $1 and $1 trillion, I suppose – probably closer to the higher figure.
How many soldiers do we need? Enough to make sure that when the enemy attacks us in the open, we continue to mop the floor with them every single time – and when they slip into the cities and try to set off a bomb to kill dozens or hundreds of innocent people, we’ve got a fighting chance of stopping them – or if they’re the rare breed of Taliban who doesn’t blow themselves up, ensuring they achieve the “martyrdom” they seek.
And we need them until the Afghans are truly ready to take on the job of providing security on their own. That will happen – it will just take a long time. Somewhere between five and 20 years – and again, I unfortunately have to guess closer to the larger number.
How should Canada in particular remain involved in Afghanistan militarily? A far-ranging consultation by the Canada-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee in Afghanistan with over 100 individuals and groups, from warlords and human rights activists to teachers, journalists, NGO administrators, and business people asked this question (though it did not limit its inquiry to the question of a military role).
Afghans recognize Canada’s sacrifices thus far and are grateful for them. They understand that Canada’s battle group is coming home and it can do so with honour.
But some of the Afghan participants also pointed out ways we might remain involved militarily even after the battle group returns to Canadian soil. Should Canada’s expertise and experience from Kandahar go to waste or could we not use that experience to continue to participate in troops training and strategic consultation with our allies? How might we assist the civilian efforts such as polio eradication from the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team? Could we not provide some level of support through Canada’s Air Wing?
How many troops? How much will this cost? As before, let’s look at the objectives. And let’s get our leaders talking about real numbers.
If we’re willing to spend $1 billion in Toronto to prevent diplomats from getting pelted with tomatoes, we certainly ought to at least be discussing some level of commitment to stop mass murder, brutalization, and violations of human rights happening beyond our borders.
Jonathon Narvey is the Editor of The Propagandist. This article first appeared in The Mark.










